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OPINIONS BELOW
The summary judgment of the Third Judicial District Court
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah is unreported, and contained in
the Transcript of Record.

(R. 3 32)
JURISDICTION

The judgment of the Third District Court was entered June
9, 1987.

Notice of Appeal was filed on June 17, 1987 and was

granted on July 21, 1987. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i).
STATUTES INVOLVED
The texts

of the

following

statutes

relevant to the

determination of the present case are set forth in the Appendix:
Utah Code Ann. §§ 31-41-14 to 31-41-22 (1953 as amended).

(The most

recent changes to these sections are not included since the accident
and facts involved in this case occurred in 1984 and 1985).
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
I.

Whether the District Court erred in denying plaintiff's

motion for partial summary judgment when the undisputed material
facts revealed that plaintiff should prevail as a matter of law.
II.

In the alternative, whether the District Court erred in

granting defendants1 motion for summary judgment when there existed
genuine issues of material fact relating to the issues of effective
cancellation, receipt of a payment providing coverage, waiver, and
bad faith and when discovery was incomplete.

1

STATEMENT OF FACTS
On or about November 7, 1983, the plaintiff purchased an
insurance policy from an agent of Farmers Insurance Group, Mid
Century

Insurance

(Farmer's),

Company,

(R. 1).

and

Prematic

Service

Corporation

The insurance policy became effective on

November 7, 1983 and continued in effect by the payment of monthly
premiums.

(R. 1, 204).

Plaintiff's initial payment was twice the

usual monthly amount so coverage would continue one additional month
in case of non-payment of a premium.

(R. 2 04).

The payment record

shows Farmers accepted a late payment on at least one occasion.
December's

1984 payment was made and accepted

January's payment.

(R. 2 05)

in January with

Plaintiff's wife on or about May 15,

1984 purchased a money order from the post office and sent that
money order to Farmers Insurance Group in order to pay the May
premium.

(R. 3, 136-139).
On May 17, 1984, plaintiff was involved in an accident

with John L. May, an uninsured motorist.

(R. 3). Plaintiff applied

for benefits under his Farmers Insurance policy on June 6, 1984 and
received benefits under the policy for approximately four months
following the accident.

(R. 121, 123-126).

On or about October 18,

1984, Farmers Insurance Group refused to pay for further lost wages
and medical expenses, claiming for the first time that plaintiff's
policy had expired for non-payment of premiums on May 15, 1987.
128) .

(R.

After paying benefits for four months and then deciding to

cancel, Farmer's printed a document showing the expiration date as
May 15 (R. 178, 327) and threatened legal action against Mr. Godoy
2

if he did not pay back the benefits he had received and that
Farmer's had paid to health care providers,

(R. 128).

Farmer's

refused to pay Mr. Godoy's unpaid medical bills and because Mr.
Godoy is unable to pay them his credit was and continues to be
damaged.

(R. 128). At the time Farmer's motion was granted, there

was outstanding written discovery (R. 94) and Farmer's employees had
not yet been deposed.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The District Court erred in denying plaintiff's motion for
partial summary judgment.

It is a well-established rule in Utah

that an insurance company waives its rights to claim no coverage
when its acts and conduct infer coverage.

To hold otherwise would

be to allow an insurance company to benefit from prejudicing an
insured by

inducing

the

insured

to belief that a payment was

accepted and a decision was made to provide coverage.
In the alternative, the District Court erred in granting
defendants' motion
existed

genuine

for summary judgment on all issues.

issues

of material

There

fact that preclude summary

judgment as a matter of law.
First, there existed a question of material fact as to
whether there had been an effective cancellation of the policy since
the plaintiff received no such cancellation notice until months
after the accident.

Defendants themselves are confused as to when

the required notice of cancellation was mailed.
Second, there existed a question as to whether defendants
received the premium which would have provided coverage at the time
3

of the accident.

At this point it is indisputable that plaintiff

mailed to Farmer's on or about May 15 a premium payment.

Farmers in

not responding to factual allegations has admitted that payment was
sent.

There were outstanding requests for production of documents

which were objected to by defendants.

Those documents may have

proved the acceptance of the premium payment in question.
Third, even if payment was not received, there existed an
issue of material fact as to whether defendants acts and conduct in
providing coverage constituted a waiver and hence would act to estop
defendants from claiming non-coverage.
Fourth, there were genuine issues of material fact as to
defendants bad faith in not continuing coverage and in threatening
plaintiff with a lawsuit if benefits were not returned.

Because of

the factual nature of the bad faith issue, plaintiff originally
moved only for a motion for partial summary judgment rather than a
motion for summary judgment.
Fifth, discovery was not complete.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
The principals surrounding the issue of waiver in an

insurance setting have been long established and deeply imbedded in
Utah decision.

Loftis v. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co., 3 8 Utah

532, 114 P. 134, 137 (1911); Sullivan v. Beneficial Life Insurance
Co. , 91 Utah 405, 64 P.2d 351; Calhoun v. Universal Credit Co., 146
P.2d 284, 287 (Utah 1944).
In the case of Loftis, the insured purchased
4

a life

insurance policy•

Premium payments were to be deducted directly

from the insured's earnings.
before the

insured

Two timely monthly payments were made

defaulted on two subsequent payments.

The

insured was killed during the third insurance period for which the
premium had not been paid.

Id. at 13 6. After the insured's death a

payment was made which covered the defaulted period.

The Utah

Supreme Court held that since premiums were expected to be paid from
a payroll deduction and since the insured's pay had fallen below the
level necessary to make the monthly payments, the insurance company
had waived its right to claim non-coverage.

Id. at 139.

The Court

held them to be a waiver even though the policy itself provided that
there could be no waiver of the terms of the policy unless in
writing.

Id. at 135. The Utah Supreme Court reasoned:
That insurance companies may waive prompt
payment of policies, although such payment is of
the essence of the contract of insurance and may
continue and treat policies in force after all.
rights thereunder had lapsed by reason of a
provision therein that nonpayment of the premium
or any part thereof shall cause the policy to
become void and of no force or effect, is too
well settled to admit of dispute.

Id. at 137.

(Emphasis added).

Additionally, the court cited 2

Joyce on Insurance § 1356 as well as other treatise as "the overwhelming weight of authority."

Id. at 138:

If an insurance company or its authorized
agent, by its habits of business or by its acts
or declarations, or . . . by any court of
conduct, has induced an honest belief in the
mind of the policy holder, which is reasonably
founded, that strict compliance with the
stipulation for punctual payment of premiums
will not be insisted upon, . . . .it will be
deemed to have waived the right to claim
forfeiture, or it will be estopped from enforc5

ing the same although the policy expressly
provides for forfeiture for nonpayment of
premiums as stipulated . . . .
Id. at 138.
With respect to the insurance companies argument that they
did not know of the lapse in the policy when they accepted a three
month old back payment, the Utah Supreme Court, stated,

lf!

when an

act of commission or omission is of such a character as to preclude
the idea of ignorance, knowledge must be presumed.

It is difficult

to perceive how the defendant or its authorized agent could have
supposed the amount was paid, when neither had received it.1"

Id.

at 140.
The comparison between the facts in Loftis and the facts
in the present case is readily apparent.

The plaintiff in the

present case also purchased an insurance policy and began making
payments as prescribed by the policy.

At one point plaintiff mailed

in a premium which was claimed to not have been received by the insurance company.

The insurance company treated the policy as if in

force and paid benefits under the policy.

These payments "induced

an honest belief in the mind of the policy holder," Id. at 138, that
the policy was in force.

Even if the premium mailed on or about May

15 were argued to be a few days late, Farmers had accepted a payment
one month late in the past*

There was no reason to believe Farmers

had not accepted this payment.

In reliance on that reasonably

founded belief, the plaintiff did not safeguard his receipts of
payment of the premium and sought needed medical assistance which he
could not otherwise have afforded to do.
6

The application of the principle of waiver exists even
when the policy specifically provides that there will be no waiver
of any terms of the policy.

Loftis at 138; Ellerbeck v. Continen-

tal Casualty Co. , 63 Utah 530, 532, 227 P. 805, 807 (1924); Calhoun
at 286; Sullivan at 3 60.
Additionally, the Utah Supreme

Court has consistently

pronounced that a "liberal interpretation" must be given to the acts
and conduct of a party holding a right of forfeiture:
Any acts or statements suggesting an
intention to keep a contract alive are liberally
construed as a waiver of the right of foreclosure.
Pollock v. New York Life Insurance Co., 691 F.2d 961, 965 (10th Cir.
1982),

citing,

Parker v. California State Life Insurance

Co., 85

Utah 595, 40 P.2d 195, 177 (1935); see Loftis at 140.
Jurisdictions and authorities other than the Utah Supreme
Court add additional weight to the proposition that an insurance
company, by its acts and conduct, may waive certain defenses.
Couch on Insurance 2d § 71:22 for example states that, "As
a general rule, acts and conduct of an insurer after a loss has
occurred which are inconsistent with a particular defense, especially where the insured has been induced to act, or acts which
would lull the insured into believing that he is covered, will
constitute

a waiver

of the defense."

Id.

[Footnote citations

omitted.]
In the present case, paying benefits under a policy for a
period of four months was inconsistent with the defense that the
policy was cancelled because of failure to pay a given premium.
7

Certainly not each time an insurance company makes an inadvertent
benefit payment would they be required to hold the policy in force.
But, where the insurance company has adequate time to investigate
and where an insured has a reasonable expectation of coverage, the
insurance company should be required to plead defenses only consistent with their acts and conduct over a period of time.
The Utah Supreme Court has relatively recently supported
the proposition that an insurance company must diligently investigate and "act promptly and reasonably in rejecting or settling the
claim."

Beck v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985).

In the present case, the accident occurred on May 17, 1984.
114).

(R.

Plaintiff filed for benefits under his policy on June 6, 1984

(R. 121) .

He received benefit payments for four months from the

time of his accident.

(R. 123-126).

Farmerfs uses a computer

system that keeps up-to-date daily information on the status of its
insureds.

(R. 178).

The insurance company could have easily met

the Beck requirement of prompt action and investigation.

Rather, it

paid benefits under the policy, lulled plaintiff into a sense of
security regarding keeping documentation of premium payments, and
then four months after the accident claimed no coverage, and refused
to pay medical bills.

This is inconsistent with the spirit and

letter of Beck.
Therefore, it is urged that the Supreme Court of Utah in
keeping with its previous decisions, reverses the District Court and
instructs the District Court to enter partial summary judgment for

8

plaintiff.
II.

IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN
GRANTING DEFENDANTS1 MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
In general, the Utah Supreme Court has held that summary

judgment is a harsh measure and opposing party's contentions are to
be

considered

in

a

light

most

favorable

to

him.

Gardner, Inc. v. Mann, 680 P.2d 23, 24 (Utah 1984).
summary

judgment

W.W. & W.B.
Additionally,

should only be granted when it clearly appears

there is no reasonable probability the opposing party could prevail.
Snyder v. Merklev,
established

693

P.2d

64,

65

standards,

the

District

(Utah

1984).

Court's

Under

grant

of

these

summary

judgment for the defendants should be reversed.
A.
A genuine issue of material fact existed as to
whether defendants effectively cancelled the
policy by merely alleging to have timely mailed
a notice of cancellation, when policy provided
specific procedures for cancellation.
It is important to note at the outset of a discussion
regarding the

interpretation

of an insurance policy's provisions

that where there is any uncertainty or ambiguity in the terms of any
specific policy, they should be construed in favor of the insured
since he did not draft the documents.
Life Insurance Co. , 593
policy

is ambiguous

susceptible

to

P.2d

534

or uncertain

different

(Utah

Village, Inc.,

1979).

interpretations,

568

If

an

insurance

in any respect, so that it is

resolved in favor of insurance coverage.
v. Park West

Williams v. First Colony

P.2d

any

doubt

should

be

W.W. & W.B. Gardner, Inc.

731

(Utah

1977);

Couch

on

Insurance 2d § 15:83 (citing numerous cases).
The applicable notice statute in effect at the time of the
9

accident in question requires "ten days notice of cancellation . . .
."

U.C.A.

§ 31-41-16

(1953).

The policy, although

somewhat

ambiguous, requires also ten days notice of cancellation.

There-

fore, it becomes crucial to know when the notice of cancellation was
mailed and when it was received.

Even though U.C.A. § 31-41-19

establishes that proof of mailing is deemed proof of notice, the
statute does not state when the ten days begins to run.

Defendants

claim notice was mailed sometime after May 1, but are uncertain as
to the exact date.

(R. 187).

In various places the defendants

admit that the notice of cancellation was not mailed until at the
earliest, May 1, 1984, 17 days prior to the accident.

(R. 327). In

a letter which was produced as part of defendants compliance with
plaintiff's

request

for

production

of

documents,

an

insurance

representative stated that on May 18, 1984, a bill and final notice
was sent.

(R. 327). If that bill was in fact sent on May 18, 1984,

the policy would have remained in effect based on the provisions of
the policy itself, at least until late May or early June.

That is

consistent with the plaintiff's affidavit in which he stated that he
had received no notice of cancellation until at least a month after
the accident.
This is also consistent with Farmer's answer to plaintiff's interrogatories wherein it stated that "the precise date of
mailing is unknown; however, it is the practice of Prematic Service
Corporation

to mail the notice

of cancellation—non-payment

of

premium during the first of the month and is believed that this
notice of cancellation with cancellation 5/15/84 was mailed during
10

the first few days of May."

(R. 325). The question of cancellation

raises two important issues. First, it raises a question as to what
the policy actually provided in terms of a notice requirement prior
to cancellation.
question.

Second, the time and manner of notice are in

The undated notice that was allegedly mailed to the

plaintiff provided that the policy would cancel on a specific date
regardless of when it was mailed or received.

(R. 130) .

If notice

of cancellation was sent on or about May 1, then why did Farmer's
proceed to pay benefits?
later.

Mr. Godoy says the notice was mailed much

Was it maiied after Farmer's and its attorney decided to

cancel the policy later that year?
Cases have held that issues surrounding the lapse and
notice of lapse of an insurance policy are material issues of fact
which are best resolved before a jury.
Insurance Co., 482 P.2d

814

Daugherty v. Wabash Life

(Nev. 1971); Hartsfield v. Carolina

Casualty Insurance Co., 411 P.2d 396 (1966); Richmeier v. Williams,
9 Kan. App. 2d 222, 675 P.2d 372 (1984).

In Richmeier, although

adopting a minority rule that notice must actually be received by
the insured before the policy may validly be cancelled, stated the
same conclusion that majority jurisdictions follow with respect to
the notice

requirement that "whether the notice was given and

received is a material question of fact.

The question is unre-

solved; therefore summary judgment was not proper.11

Id. at 375.

In Hartsfield, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that under
a cancellation clause, even though mailing of notice of cancellation
to an insured was a prerequisite to effective cancellation of a
11

policy, denial of receipt of notice of cancellation rebutted the
prima facia case of mailing and created an issue of fact that must
be resolved by the trier of facts.
In

a

like

manner,

the

Hartsfield, 411 P.2d at 397.
issue

of

the

effectiveness

of

cancellation of an insurance policy presents an issue of fact that
must go before the trier of fact.
mailed

a

timely

notice

of

The defendant claims to have

cancellation,

but

the

plaintiff

has

rebutted this prima facia evidence by claiming that no notice was
received until well after the accident.
B.

A genuine issue of material fact exists as
whether the defendants acts constituted a waiver
of their rights to claim non-coverage.

to

In Highlands Insurance Co. v. Allstate Insurance Co., 688
F.2d 398 (5th Cir. 1982), the court explained that waiver is usually
a question of fact to be determined by the jury or, in a bench trial
by the court.

Id. at 4 04.

Furthermore, the court explained that:

Even "slight circumstances" will support a
finding that an insurer has waived a forfeiture
clause in an insurance policy.
For "courts
liberally construe in favor of an insured's acts
or circumstances by the insurer indicating an
intention to waive a forfeiture."
Id.

This conclusion is supported by Utah case law which states that

whether a waiver has taken place or not "ordinarily depends upon the
peculiar

facts

and circumstances

of a given case, and,

in most

instances, presents a question of fact, rather than of law, or at
least

a

mixed

question

of

fact

and

law."

Pollock v. New York

Life Insurance Co., 691 F.2d 961 (10th Cir. 1982), quoting Loftis,
114 P. at 139.
In the present

case, the material
12

facts which

are in

dispute

as

to

whether

a waiver

occurred

are whether

by paying

benefits to the plaintiff over a four month period, an insurance
company has induced reliance and hence waived its right to later
claim non-coverage.
acts

by

an

believe that

Reasonable minds may differ as to whether such

insurance

company

would

induce

a reasonable man to

insurance coverage would be provided.

Mr. Godoy's

credit was damaged when he was unable to pay his medical bills.

In

reliance upon the insurance company's acts and conduct, Mr. Godoy
received

necessary

medical

attention

which

he

would

not

have

attempted to receive had he not been induced into believing that
coverage would

be provided.

Additionally, because coverage was

provided for such an extended period of time, he failed to safeguard
his various

receipts of premium payments which would have esta-

blished his eligibility for benefits under the policy.
Because of these factual disputes, which are material to
the issues of waiver, summary judgment was wrongfully granted in the
court below in favor of the defendants.
C.

A genuine issue of material fact exists as to
. whether the defendant actually received a payment
providing coverage at the time of the accident.

A factual dispute relating to the payment or tender of
premiums

is

the

type

of material

resolved by the trier of fact.
Additionally,
mailing

is

U.C.A.

sufficient proof

issue

of

fact which must be

Daugherty, 482 P.2d at 815.
§ 31-41-19
of notice

provides

that proof of

of cancellation.

If the

insurer could allege notice by proof of mailing, then justice would
also require that the insured could establish coverage by proof of
13

mailing.

Thiessens v. Department of Employment Sec., Bd. of Review

of Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 663 P.2d 72 (Ut. 1983).

(Stating that

mailing of a letter postage prepaid and properly addressed creates
an inference that the letter reached its destination.)
In the present case, the plaintiff and his wife both
signed

affidavits

that payment

to provide

coverage during the

accident was properly stamped, addressed and mailed to defendants.
(R. 136, 138-139).

According to Thiessens, this creates an infer-

ence that defendants received that payment.

As of yet, defendants

have brought forth no evidence to rebut this presumption.
defendants have
specific

admitted

paragraphs

Judgment.

of

In fact,

that payment was made by not denying
Plaintiff's

Motion

for

Partial

Summary

(R. 301, 302).
Therefore, at a minimum, the issue of payment raises a

question of fact which must be resolved by a trier of fact.
Talcott,

Inc. v. Reynolds, 529

P.2d

352, 65 Mont. 404

James
(1974),

(stating that when an addressee denies receipt, the question is left
to a determination by a jury).
D.
As

There is a question of fact as to bad faith.
cited

above under

Beck v. Farmers, failure to act

reasonably and promptly in rejecting a claim can constitute bad
faith.

In this case there is at least a question of fact whether

Farmer's acted reasonably and promptly in rejecting the claim after
paying benefits for four months.

Especially when it printed a

document after paying benefits showing cancellation was two days
before the accident and threatened Mr. Godoy with suit if he did not
14

return benefits it had paid even though Farmer's knew that most of
the benefits had gone to pay

for health care providers which

Farmer's had given Mr. Godoy permission to use.
E.

The District Court erred in granting defendants1
motion for summary judgment since discovery had
not yet been completed.

In the case of Auerbach's, Inc. v. Kimball, 572 P. 2d 376
(Utah 1977) the Utah Supreme Court held that a grant of summary
judgment is premature where discovery is not yet complete, since the
non-moving party claimed that further discovery would provide facts
sufficient to defeat the motion for summary judgment.

Also, in

Cox v. Winters, 678 P. 2d 311 the Utah Supreme Court held that the
trial court abused its discretion in granting summary judgment by
denying a party the opportunity to conduct further discovery.
Likewise, in the present case, there were outstanding discovery requests which would have provided facts sufficient to defeat
the motion for summary judgment.
Godoy's memorandum

opposing

This was pointed out in Mr.

summary

judgment.

(R. 309, 310).

Plaintiff had requested that defendants produce documents relating
to the decision to deny coverage.

(R. 289) . Defendants objected to

this request and therefore forced plaintiff to file a motion to
compel.

(R. 288). The documents not produced would have tended to

show first, whether defendants had received plaintiff's premium
payment; second, when the defendants knew they were going to deny
coverage; and three, why the defendants did not provide coverage.
These facts, if substantiated, could have been used to defeat the
motion for summary judgment.

The District Judge erred in granting
15

summary judgment when there were such outstanding discovery to be
completed.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the
Third District Court of the State of Utah should be reversed and
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted.
alternative,

the

judgment

should

be reversed

and

In the

remanded for

proceedings on the merits.
Respectfully Submitted,
CHRISTE/fsEN, JENSEN & POWELL, P.C.

By

Jenton M. Hatch
Attorney for Rudolfo Godoy
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arrest of a person for violation of and
conviction under this act; authorizing political subdivisions within the state to
adopt ordinances and regulations consistent with this act; and providing an effeclive date.—L. 1974, ch. 10
Effective Date.
Section 3 of Laws 1974, ch. 10 provided
that the act should take effect upon approval. Approved February 13, 1974.
Collateral References.
Automobiles®^.
60 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles §2."
7 Am. Jur. 2d 606, Aurornn..:
Highway Traffic § 13.

;

See Am. Jur. 2d, No-I 'ault
§§ 1-34, when published,

Insurance

Validity and construction of "no-fault"
automobile insurance plans, 42 A. L. E.
3d 229.
Validity of Motor Vehicle Financial
Responsibility Act, 35 A. L. R. 2d 1011.
L a w

Revie
ws.
No-Fault Automobile Insurance in Utah
—State Constitutional Issues, 1970 Utah
L . Rev. 248.
Compensation Svstems and Utah's NoFault Statute, 1973 Utah L. Rev. 383.
Countrywide Overview of Automobile
No-Fault Insurance, 23 Defense L. J. 443
(1974).

ARTICLE 2
CANCELLATION OF POLICIES
Section 31-41-14,
31-41-15.
31-41-16.
31-41-17.

31-41-18.
31-41-19.
31-41-20.
31-41 2L
'ii 41 '-'i

Definition of terms.
Notice of cancellation of policy—Requirements for validity—Exceptions.
Notice of cancellation of policy—Time for mailing or delivery—Bequest for reason for cancellation—Exception.
Nonrenewal of policy—-Time limit for mailing or delivery of notice
of intention—Exceptions—Termination on effective date of other
insurance—Renewal not waiver of grounds for cancellation—Request for reason for nonrenewal.
Discriminatory practices in cancellation or nonrenewal prohibited.
Proof of mailing deemed proof of notice.
Cancellation or nonrenewal of bodily injury and property damage
liability coverage—Notice to insured of assigned risk plan.
Commissioner or insurer absolved from liability for notice pertain• ing to cancellation or nonrenewal.
Policies not covered by act.

31-4144. Definition of terms.—As used in this act:
(1) "Policy" means an automobile insurance policy providing coverage
for any or all of the following coverages: Collision, comprehensive, bodily
injury liability, property damage liability, medical payments, and uninsured motorist coverage, or any combination of them delivered or issue 1
for delivery in this state, insuring a single individual, husband and wi;V
or family members residing in the same household, as the named insureds.
The insured vehicles designated in the policy must be of the following
types:
(a) All motor vehicles of the two or four door sedan type, including
station wagons and sports cars, that are not used to transport goods or
persons for hire in the regular course of business.; or
(b) Any other four-wheel motor vehicle with a load capacity of 9,000
pounds or less which is not used in the occupation, profession, or business
of the insured.
(2) "Renewal" or "to renew" means the issuance and delivery by an
insurer of a policy replacing at the end of the policy period a policy
384
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previously issued and delivered by the same insurer, or the issuance and
delivery of a certificate or notice extending the term of the policy beyond
its policy period or term; but any policy with a policy period or term of
less than twelve months shall for the purpose of this act be considered as
if written for a policy period or term of twelve months; and any policy
written for a term longer than one year, or any policy with no fixed expiration date, shall, for the purposes of this act, be considered as if
written for successive policy periods or terms of one year, and such policy
may be terminated at the expiration of any annual period upon giving
thirty days' notice of nonrenewal prior to such anniversary date, and
such nonrenewal shall not be subject to any other provisions of this act.
(3) "Nonpayment of premium" means failure of the named insured
to discharge when due any of his obligations in connection with the payment of premiums on the policy, or any installment of such premium,
whether the premium is payable directly to the insurer or its agent, or indirectly under any premium finance plan or extension of credit, or in connection with the payment of any membership fees or dues to an association
or organization, other than an insurance association or organization, where
the payment of such fees or dues is a prerequisite to obtaining or eontinu
ing insurance in force.
History: L. 1973, ch. 56, § 1.
Title ol Act,
An act relating to the cancellation of
automobile insurance policies; providing
certain conditions under which the insurer may cancel the policy or fail to
renew it after proper and timely notice
has been served on the insured; absolving

the insurance commissioner and insurer
from liability arising out of any cancellation; exempting policies written under the
assignment of risk provisions of section
41-12-35; and providing an effective date.
—L. 1973, ch. 00.
Cross-Reference.
Automobile liabilitv i*-.;. •• i. *)

• ""•

31-41-15, Notice of cancellation of policy—Requiiemeiits for validity •Exceptions.—(1) A notice of cancellation of a policy shall he valid only
if it is based on one or more of the following reasons :
fa) Nonpayment of premium; or
(b) The driver's license or motor vehicle registration of either the
named insured or any operator who customarily operates an automobile
insured under the policy has been under suspension or revocation during
the policy period, or if the policy is a renewal, during its policy period or
the ISO days immediately preceding its effective date; or
(c) The applicant knowingly made a false statement on the application
for insurance,
(2) This section does not apply M-. tl:i> pn t ;^. or coverage which has
been in effect less than sixty days at the time notice of cancellation is
mailed or delivered by the insurer, unless it is a renewal policy
(3) This section does not apply to the nonrenewal of a policy.
History: L. 1973, ch. 56, §2,
, _ .
Collateral References.
Iiisurance<3=>228(l).
4," C.J.S. Insurance § 450.
4;) Am. Jur. 2d 444, Insurance §399.

Cancellation of compulsory or "financial
responsibility" automobile insurance, 171
A L > R< 5 5 0 ^ 3 4 A # L # R . 2 d 1297.
Insurance agent's statement or conduct
indicating that insurer's cancellation of
policy shall not take effect as binding on
insurer, 3 A. L, R. 3d 1135.
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Liability of insurer, under compulsory
statutory vehicle liability policy, to injured third persons, notwithstanding inaured's failure to comply with policy conditions, as measured by policy limits or

by limits of Financial Responsibility Act,
29 A. L. E. 2d 817.
Remedies and measure of damages for
wrongful cancellation of liability and
property insurance, 34 A. L, E. 3d 385.

31-41-16. Notice of cancellation of policy—Time for mailing or delivery
—Request for reason for cancellation—Exception.—(1) No notice of cancellation, of a policy to which section 31-41-15 applies shall be valid unless
mailed or delivered by the insurer to the named insured at least twenty
days prior to the effective date of cancellation. Where cancellation is for
nonpayment of premium,, at least ten days' notice of cancellation accompanied by the reason therefor must be given.
(2) Where the reason for cancellation is not included with the notice
of cancellation, the insurer, upon written request of the named insured
mailed or delivered to the insurer not less than fifteen days prior to the
effective date of cancellation shall specify in writing the reason for such
cancellation, which reasons shall be mailed or delivered to the named insured within five days after receipt of request.
(3) This section does not apply to the nonrenewal of a policy.
History: L. 1973, ch. 56, § 3.

45 C.J.S. Insurance § 450.
43 Am. Jur. 2d 450, Insurance § 405,

Collateral References,
Insurance<§=>229(l).

31-41-17. Nonrenewal of policy—Time limit for mailing or delivery of
notice of intention—Exceptions—Termination on effective date of other insurance—Renewal not waiver of grounds for cancellation—Request for
reason for nonrenewal.— (1) No insurer shall refuse to renew a policy
unless this insurer or its agent shall mail or deliver to the named insured,
at the address shown in the policy, at least thirty days' advance notice of
its intention not to renew. This section shall not apply :
(a) Where the insurer has manifested its willingness to renew,
(b) Where there has been nonpayment of premium.
(c) Where the insured fails to pay any advance premium,, required
by the insurer for renewal.
(2) Notwithstanding the failure of an insurer to lomply \\w. * bis
section, the policy shall terminate on the effecini; dme of any other insurance policy covering the same automobile.
(3) Renewal of a policy shall not constitute a waiver or estoppel with
respect to grounds for cancellation which existed prior to the effective
date of the renewal.
(4) In the event an Insurer refuses to renew, the insured by written
request may demand a written notification of the reason or reasons for
nonrenewal. Notification must be given the insured within twenty days after
receipt of such request.
History: L. 1973, ch. 56, § L
Collateral References.
Insurance€=>145(4).
44 C.J.S. Insurance § 283.
43 Am, Jur. 2d 427, Insurance § 379,

Provision of policy for mailing of notice
to insured's address as stated therein, as
affected by change of address, 63 A. L. R.
2d 570.
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31-41-18. Discriminatory practices in cancellation or nonrenewal prohibited.—No insurer shall cancel or refuse to renew a policy of automobile
insurance on any person with at least two years' driving experience solely
because of the age, residence, race, color, creed, national origin, ancestry or
lawful occupation (including the military service) of anyone who is insured or solely because another insurer has refused to write a policy, or has
canceled or has refused to renew an existing policy in, which that person
was the named insured.
History: L. 1973, cli. 56, § 5.
_ Cross-Reference.
Unfair or deceptive acts or practices,
31-27-1 et seq.

Collateral Keferences.
Insurance<S=»4.
4 4 CJ^
I n 8 u r a n c e § 59<
43 Am, Jur, 2d 108, insurance § 52.

31-41-19. Proof of mailing deemed proof of notice,—Proof of mailing
to the named insured at the address shown on the policy of the notice of
cancellation, the intention not to renew, or of reasons for cancellation shall
be sufficient proof of the notice.
History: L. 1973s ch. 56, §6.
Collateral References,
Provision, of policy for mailing of no-

tice to insured's address as stated therein,
as affected by change of address, 63 A. L.
j ^ 2d 570,

31-41-20, Cancellation or nonrenewal of bodily injury and property
damage liability coverage—Notice to insured of assigned risk plan.—When
bodily injury and property damage liability coverage is canceled other
than for nonpayment of premium, or in the event of failure to renew the
bodily injury and property damage liability coverage in which section
31-41-17 applies, the insurer shall notify the named insured of his possible
eligibility for automobile liability insurance through the assigned risk plan
set forth in section 41-12-35 and where he may obtain information concerning such plan. This information shall accompany or be included in the
notice of cancellation or the notice of intent not to renew.
History: L. 1973, ch. 56, § 7.

31-41-21. Commissioner oi m^m1
aty for notice pertaining to cancellation or nonrenew.,
• - .
-io liability on the
part of the commissioner of insurance or any insurer, its authorized agents,
or representatives, or any person, firm, or corporation furnishing to the insurer any notice or information pertaining to cancellation or nonrenewal of
any policy.
History: L. 1973, ch. 56, § 8.
,
"
Collateral References.
Constitution;]! L«iw<S=>70(l)p.

16A C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 464,
63 Am. Jur. 2d 810, Public Officers and
Employees § 304.

31-41-22. Policies not covered by act.—Tins act shall not apply to any
policy issued under an assigned risk plan set forth in section 41-12-35 or
to any policy insuring more than four automobiles, or to any policy covering garage, automobile sales agency, repair shop, service station, or public
parking place operation hazard, or to any policy of insurance issued princi387
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pally to cover the preiuises of an insured even though such insurance may
also provide some incidental coverage for liability arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of motor vehicles on the premises of such insured,
or on the ways immediately adjoining such premises.
History: L. 1973, ch. 56, §9.
Effective Date,
Section 10 of Laws 1973, ch. 56 pro-

vided: "This act shall take effect; on
January 1, 1974, and shall apply to poli, . } e s -written or renewed on or after that
date,"

CHAPTER 42
HEALTH MA1NTK\AN< !•] ORGANIZATIONS
Section 31-42-1.
31-42-2.
31-42-3.
31-42-4.
31-42-5.
31-42-6.

31-42-7.
31-42-8.
31-42-9.
31-42-10.
31-42-11.
31-42-12.
31-42-13.

31-42-14.
31-42-15.
31-42-16.
31-42-17.

31-42-18.
31-42-19.
31-42-20.
31-42-21.
31-42-22.
31-42-23.
31-42-24.
31-42-25.
31-42-26.
31-42-27,
31-42-28.
31-42-29.
31-42-30.
31-42-31.
31-42-32,

Pita lion of act.
Declaration of public policy.
Definition of terms.
Certificate of authority required for health maintenance organization.
Application for certificate—Filing—Supporting documents.
Application and documents transmitted to director of division of
health—Determinations and certification by director—Determinations and procedure for issuance or denial of certificate by commissioner.
Revocation of certificate—Grounds.
Administrative penalty in lieu of revocation of certificate.
Commissioner's assistance to organizations.
Powers of organizations—'Health care professionals.
Procedure for participation by members and for resolving corn
plaints by members or providers.
Contracts between organization and members—Disclosure of benefits.
Discrimination in transfer of contract from group to individual
basis and rate prohibited—Grounds for cancellation of contract—
Underwriting classifications and experience rating a u t h o r i z e d Annual enrollment of members.
Annual report by organization to commissioner and director.
Examination of organization and providers.
Annual audit of organization's internal quality control.
Untrue or misleading solicitation and contractual materials prohibited—-Advertising names or qualifications of employees or
providers prohibited—Filing of promotional materials—Application of unfair trade practices laws.
Applications, reports and records as matters of public record—
Financial materials excepted.
Reimbursement by member of benefits under governmental or
private health care plans.
Licensing of agents.
Restrictions on cancellation, or nonrenewal of membership.
Words descriptive of insurance prohil dted in titles or promotional
material.
Bonding of organization personnel.
Rules and regulations of commissioner and board of health.
Health maintenance organization advisory council—Members—App o i n t m e n t — T e r m s — Vacancies — Chairman and vice-chairman—•
Meetings—Quorum-—Expenses—Duties.
Notice of action, to revoke certificate or levy p e n a l t y — H e a r i n g Judicial review.
Action for injunctive relief.
Fees.
Violation—Misdemeanor.
Director's contracts for recommendations, investigations, examinations and surveys.
Application of Insurance Code and Health Maintenance Organizations Act.
State employees' enrollment in organization authorized.
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